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1The Parliamentary Dimension 
of Defence Cooperation
Introduction
The role of parliaments is a neglected factor in the development of European defence 
cooperation. This is clearly in need of rectification as parliaments have a crucial role 
in making deeper defence cooperation a success. In most of the EU member states, 
the elected representatives decide about planning, procurement, the deployment of 
troops and the budget allocated to defence. The 2016 Netherlands EU Presidency 
therefore devoted a seminar to this issue, organised by the Ministry of Defence in 
cooperation with the Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ on 14-15 March 
in Amsterdam. High-level panels and a mixed audience of parliamentarians, national 
and European officials, members of think tanks, the military and academics discussed 
‘The Parliamentary Dimension of Defence Cooperation’.
This Clingendael Report addresses a number of issues discussed at the seminar. 
The first section reflects the crucial role that parliamentarians have in bringing 
politics back into the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). They are key to 
creating a political narrative on the importance of defence, defence cooperation and 
sovereignty understood as ‘the ability to act’. The second section is devoted to the 
need to defend defence in parliament and towards the general public. Besides a small 
circle of dedicated parliamentarians, knowledge about and support for defence are 
not widespread in the European and national parliaments. The third section underlines 
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the need for more transparency from governments towards parliaments on defence 
cooperation. The Report’s final section is devoted to the interparliamentary dimension 
that needs strengthening and looks into the workings of the Interparliamentary 
Conference and the parliamentary dimension of cluster cooperation.
This Clingendael Report highlights the main topics that were debated at the seminar, 
but does not attempt to reflect all points of the discussion. It is therefore neither a 
verbatim record nor a summary of the debate. Rather, it lists key issues which need 
to be addressed for parliaments to play a role in the deepening of defence cooperation. 
The Report concludes with a number of recommendations for the way forward. 
The Clingendael Institute bears sole responsibility for the contents of this report.
Bring politics back into CSDP
Despite its ambitious origins and despite the repeated underlining of the importance 
of the EU as a security provider, CSDP has in recent years lost its political appeal. 
CSDP has become an almost impenetrable and technical policy area that is discussed 
in increasingly smaller circles of ‘insiders’. While de-politisation is a well-known 
phenomenon in the process of European integration, for CSDP to move forward it first 
needs to be brought back to the political arena. Security and defence are issues at the 
heart of the European integration process and a core responsibility of member states. 
Treating them only as a policy which needs technical tweaking will result in CSDP and 
defence cooperation further losing political guidance and momentum. First and foremost 
national parliamentarians, but also the members of the European Parliament, have to 
play a role in creating a trans-European politics of defence. The Global Strategy on 
Foreign and Security Policy and its implementation provide an ideal opportunity to put 
the EU’s security and defence role high on the political agenda. Parliamentarians should 
clarify the strategy in public debates and defend the political choices that arise from it 
to their own electorate but also cross-border in other member states.
A political narrative
A trans-European politics of defence should breed a political narrative to communicate 
the importance of defence and European defence cooperation. It should also integrate 
defence with other areas such as maritime policy, border security, industry, research and 
technology and so forth. Such a narrative can be structured around three observations 
on European defence. First, while development, preventive engagement and diplomacy 
are at the forefront of the European approach to security, they must be backed up by 
credible military forces in order to be effective in a world where power politics and the 
use of force are a reality. This comprehensive approach combines internal and external 
civilian and military elements from across sectors, making defence not a separate policy 
silo but one of many policy areas that are highly intertwined.
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Second, Europe is too dependent on the United States for its defence. The message 
from Washington is clear: Europe’s free-riding party is over. Europe therefore requires a 
more credible and autonomous defence capacity, regardless of whether one is motivated 
by keeping the trans-Atlantic relationship alive or by having the ability to form policies 
independently of the United States.
Third, while there has been under-investment in defence in most European states, 
the major obstacle to a credible collective European defence output is the lack of 
cooperation. Europe’s combined defence spending is considerable, but fragmented 
and nationally-oriented defence efforts have led to only a marginal collective capacity 
with shortfalls and little ‘bang for the buck’. In fact, capabilities have fallen to critically 
low levels, putting into question Europe’s ability to conduct the operations vital to its 
territorial and societal security. Opposing defence cooperation by arguing that it leads 
to a ‘loss of sovereignty’ is unhelpful: having full authority over national forces means 
little if they are too small to address the security challenges at hand.
In fact, being unable to act would constitute a much greater loss of sovereignty than 
having to consult with partner countries on planning and procurement or relying 
on some of their capabilities for deployments. How to structure European defence 
cooperation can be decided on a case-by-case basis – and there are a number of 
models and approaches to choose from – but in any case the three observations 
on European defence make clear that we need significant steps forward in 
defence cooperation.
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Defend defence
There is a great need to engage the general public and members of parliament 
outside of the defence committees. Other members of parliament tend to have limited 
awareness of defence issues and little sympathy for defence. Defence has been isolated 
from other policy areas and is often the first to see its budgets cut, typically without 
adequate consideration of the implications for the capabilities and effectiveness of the 
armed forces. Convincing these MPs of the importance of defence, defence cooperation, 
and stable budgets is not easy, but needs to be done. One way to do this is to increase 
the interlinkage between various committees touching 
upon aspects of defence by holding joint meetings with 
committees on, for example, the economy, budgets, 
home affairs, transport or intelligence. This would 
expose other parliamentarians to defence issues and 
can generate broader support for policies.
In the national context, such consensus can be further capitalised upon by setting up 
multi-year agreements on the purpose, policy direction and budgets for defence – as 
has already been done in Sweden and Denmark. These national agreements should 
be based on a broad consensus between stakeholders, encompassing coalition and 
opposition parties, governmental and non-governmental experts. Multi-year defence 
agreements are foremost tools to improve national defence policy, but the clarity and 
stability they provide also help governments to become more reliable partners for 
European defence cooperation.
While defence is the prerogative of the national parliaments, the European Parliament 
has a role to play in support of CSDP, stimulating defence research and innovation 
through the EU budget and through flanking EU policies. In the European parliament, 
the importance of defence as being broader than just a subsidiary to foreign affairs 
should by acknowledged by upgrading SEDE to a fully-fledged committee. This would 
increase SEDE’s capacity to issue its own reports, arrange contacts with national 
parliaments, and engage with the plenary. However, the active role of the EP in 
supporting European cooperation should not be taken for granted; with the rise of 
EU-sceptic parties the EP may take on a more adverse stance. It is therefore crucial 
that these MEPs are engaged in debates on the need for CSDP and European defence 
cooperation. In addition, long-term support can be secured through the formation of a 
broad coalition-based agreement – across parliamentary groups – on the principal need 
for European defence cooperation.
Parliamentarians also need to defend defence towards the general public. Parliaments 
play an important role in interfacing between the necessities pointed out by policy 
experts and the general public. Although public polls generally show high support 
for the armed forces, championing defence and European defence cooperation does 
A politics of defence 
should not be limited to 
the defence-minded
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not translate well into electoral votes. This problem is compounded by the rise of 
Euro-scepticism. Governmental and non-governmental experts can advocate European 
defence cooperation, but politicians need to explain its relevance to the general public. 
In some cases, it will require that politicians show statesmanship and defend decisions 
that are in the long-term interest of the nation despite being unpopular in the short term.
Increase knowledge within parliaments
Having a political narrative is not enough to create a viable politics of defence. 
Parliaments need a higher level of knowledge about defence in order to make, or call for, 
the right decisions for an effective defence capacity. Short-term decisions on defence 
budgets, procurement, and international cooperation in particular need to be based 
on an understanding of the long-term implications they have for the armed forces, the 
kind of operations they can perform and the threats they can address. Since European 
cooperation is needed to create an effective defence capacity, parliaments need to 
increase their knowledge in this area. This requires a more intimate knowledge of, for 
example, missions, procedures, programmes and benchmarks of the EU and NATO. 
As armed forces are increasingly being deployed in the context of multinational 
operations, it is also important that parliamentarians are more aware of the implications 
of national decision-making for these operations, 
especially when caveats are imposed. It is therefore 
important that members of parliament pay working visits 
to the EU institutions and national representations in 
Brussels, as well as to CSDP operations. The European 
Parliament, because of its more intimate knowledge 
of CSDP, should be actively sharing information and 
insights with national parliaments in a structural 
manner. Parliaments involved in clusters or bilateral 
defence cooperation should regularly meet up, organise 
joint working visits and engage in structural information-sharing. These activities are 
important to generate a better understanding of mutual dependencies, increase trust in 
the partnership, and lessen worries about assured access to shared capabilities. Inviting 
commanders from partner countries to give their views should also be considered.
Increase transparency
Governments, as well as the European Commission, EEAS and other EU agencies, need 
to increase the level of information provided to parliaments and involve parliamentarians 
from the outset of new cooperation initiatives. Increased transparency and being 
Parliamentarians need 
to be more aware of the 
implications of national 
decision-making for 
operations
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frank about the implications of defence cooperation are needed to build trust between 
governments and parliamentarians and to build a bridge to the general public. 
Following the proposal by the German Rühe Commission, governments should provide 
regular overviews of the implications of and the obligations that come with deeper 
defence cooperation. These reports and the parliamentary discussions that will be 
held on them will contribute to a heightened understanding of the commitments and 
mutual dependencies that follow from deeper defence cooperation. When involving 
parliamentarians more and at an earlier stage of defence cooperation it is important to 
guard the constitutional division of roles between the parliament and the government. 
At the end of the day, it is governments that have the authority and expertise to shape 
policies and operations.
To support the independent oversight function of parliaments, members of parliament 
need readily available, readable and politically salient information and analysis alongside 
what the government supplies. Parliaments should have access to either in-house 
research expertise on defence or be able to commission research externally. Many 
parliaments have some research service in place, but often lack the funds to commission 
the necessary research. Budgets should be allocated to support this vital function.
7The Parliamentary Dimension of Defence Cooperation | Clingendael Report, April 2016
Annual progress meeting
Holding governments to account is one of the core tasks of parliamentarians. 
Consecutive European Councils that dealt with defence were not, or only partially, 
followed by other ministerial meetings holding member states responsible for living up to 
their promises. While more peer pressure from Ministers of Defence among themselves 
is to be welcomed, parliamentarians should step up the pressure on their governments 
for deeper defence cooperation. While a ‘Eurozone-type’ semester on defence would 
be the optimal option, a yearly ‘Progress Meeting on Defence’ could be a good interim 
measure. At such a meeting, parliamentarians would be able to enter into a debate with 
both the High Representative Federica Mogherini and possibly the Defence Minister 
of the country holding the EU Presidency. They would discuss the progress, or the 
lack thereof, in achieving the promises that the ministers have made themselves at the 
various Council meetings. While the Defence Minister can of course not represent all 
27 Ministers, he/she could report back to the next Defence Ministerial. Such a Progress 
Meeting would considerably up the political stakes for ministers and help in bringing 
politics back into CSDP. The Progress Meetings can be a useful tool to ensure political 
commitment to the Global Strategy. Parliamentarians should use these meetings to make 
sure that the strategy is implemented and translated into actionable proposals.
An improved Interparliamentary Conference on CFSP/CSDP
The format of the Interparliamentary Conference on CFSP/CSDP needs to evolve. 
The biannual meetings are useful as a regular meeting place for national and European 
parliamentarians from Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees. However, discussions 
at the IPC biannual meetings tend to be rather general in nature, also due to the large 
and formal setting. In the case of smaller and ad hoc work sessions, there is a lack 
of follow-up. Therefore, the IPC format needs more flexibility, more focus and more 
concrete deliverables. Various flexible formats are thinkable, such as joint national and 
European parliamentarians’ working visits to CSDP operations. Ad hoc formats, such 
as, for example, task forces of parliamentarians from member states and the European 
Parliament in which they work together on specific issues and deliver reports with 
concrete proposals would also be advisable. Such smaller, focused settings would be 
able to tackle pressing issues and produce more concrete deliverables. Moreover, it 
enables the involvement of a wider and varied group of parliamentarians. This improved 
and more effective IPC also needs a stronger institutional set-up.
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Functional and cluster interparliamentary cooperation
In a majority of the EU member states national parliamentarians have a key role in the 
deployment of troops. Working in multinational formations and contributing to rapid 
response mechanisms complicates decision-making, particularly when there is no time 
to lose. A very concrete measure is to not only engage in political exercises ahead of, for 
instance, an EU Battlegroup, where ministers are involved, but also to devise exercises 
in which parliamentarians get to practice their role. A case in point is the seven-nation 
EU Battlegroup that will be on call from July 2016. The seven parliaments should get in 
touch and organise such an exercise to be optimally prepared for possible deployment.
Deeper defence cooperation in small groups or clusters requires a parliamentary 
dimension. Modular operational cooperation or even integrated standing troop 
formations bring along mutual dependencies. The increasingly close cooperation 
between, for example, the Netherlands and Germany or between France and the 
United Kingdom are cases in point. These parliaments should share information on 
these dependencies in a systematic manner. They should consider joint defence 
committee sessions to bring the parliamentary dimension into line with the extent of 
their defence cooperation. We not only need interoperable armed forces in Europe, 
but also interoperable politicians.
The way forward
Distilled from the foregoing, we have identified a number of concrete and actionable 
recommendations. The first recommendation is an exception in that it is not ‘concrete’, 
but it is the prerequisite for the ones that follow.
– Foster a trans-European politics of defence
Parliamentarians are politicians, which makes it their job to create political narratives 
and to package the options and dilemmas of European defence in such a way that 
there is a buy-in from the public at large.
– Organise an annual ‘Defence Progress Meeting’
An annual meeting where the promises of governments about strengthening 
defence cooperation are discussed with the High Representative and possibly 
the Defence Minister of the country holding the EU Presidency.
– Provide regular overviews to parliaments on defence cooperation
Governments should supply their parliaments with regular overviews of the 
implications of and the obligations that come with deeper defence cooperation.
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– Create an independent parliamentary research capacity
This is a condition for the independent oversight function of parliaments and for 
parliaments to be able to play their critical role in bringing European defence 
cooperation forward.
– Organise a parliamentary exercise ahead of the EU Battlegroup for 
semester two of 2016
In addition to military preparations, political readiness across the troop-contributing 
countries is important for EU Battlegroups to be deployed in time or even at all.
– Build the parliamentary dimension of defence cooperation in clusters
Organise regular joint defence committee meetings and start structural 
information-sharing with defence committees of partner countries.
– Improve the IPC on CFSP/CSDP
Allow various formats with changing compositions of parliamentarians; prioritise 
a number of issues that result in concrete deliverables and strengthen the IPC’s 
institutional ability to facilitate this.
